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Abstract 
The Niger Delta has since the 1960’s, been associated with restiveness and agitations. The agitations in the 
region assumed violent dimensions from the 1990’s when different militant groups in the region launched 
sustained attacks on oil and gas installations and facilities within the region thereby crippling the Nigerian 
economy which is woven round oil and gas. At the centre of the agitations is the clamour for justice by the 
oppressed and marginalized ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta who argue that although the Nigerian State is 
sustained by the revenue derived from oil and gas exploited in the region, they remain amongst the rank of the 
poorest ethnic groups in the federation of Nigeria. The Niger Delta has not benefitted from the stupendous oil 
wealth generated from the region. The principle of derivation has evolved as part of the efforts by the federal 
government of Nigeria to address the inequities and injustice inherent in the revenue allocation system whereby 
oil revenue collected by the federal government is re-distributed to the constituent units. Although the derivation 
principle was not designed originally for the Niger Delta, its association with the region derives from the total 
dependence of the Nigerian economy on oil and gas since the 1970’s. It is argued that the domination of the 
Nigerian federation by the three majority ethnic groups of Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo respectively and the 
superior-subordinate relationship between the majority and minority ethnic groups in Nigeria have  resulted in 
the complete distortion of the derivation principle to the detriment of the oil-producing ethnic minorities of the 
Niger delta. The conspiracy amongst the three majority ethnic groups has ensured that the derivation payable to 
the oil-producing states of the Niger Delta region does not exceed thirteen percent (13%) in spite of the fact that 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) permits an upward review of the 13% 
payable.  When the current rate of 13% is compared with the 100% and much later 50% paid to solid mineral-
producing regions of the federation before the commercial discovery of oil in the Niger delta, the injustice being 
inflicted on the Niger Delta ethnic minorities becomes very apparent. This paper, therefore, argues that the 
derivation principle as currently practised has failed to serve as a tool of distributive justice. Thus, the paper 
proposes an upward review of the derivative principle from 13% to 30% with a further progression to 50% by 
2020.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Issues of justice, fairness and equity have remained the defining factors not only in our private lives but also in 
the social, political and economic spheres whether at national, regional or international levels. These issues have 
defined, redefined, shaped, strengthened or weakened entities according to how they were perceived by relevant 
actors. Therefore, the centrality of justice to the development of a socially cohesive, politically stable and 
economically vibrant polity cannot be over-emphasized.  
The principle of derivation has remained a contentious feature in Nigerian distributive federalism since 
oil derived from the Niger Delta region became the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy. The deadlock experienced at 
the 2014 National Conference following the inability of the delegates to reach a unanimous agreement on the 
principle of derivation and the curious recommendation by the conference that the federal government should set 
up a technical committee to address this issue along with other unresolved issues demonstrate in vivid terms the 
contentious character of the principle of derivation as a fiscal tool.   
The purpose of this article is to analyse the principle of derivation as a fiscal tool in Nigerian federalism 
and to answer the answer whether the principle has served as an effective tool of distributive justice in Nigeria’s 
troubled Niger Delta region. The article argues that the ethnic politics in Nigeria coupled with the irrepressible 
capacities of the three majority ethnic groups in the federation, namely Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo to 
manipulate the application of the derivation principle to meet their own economic and political interests have 
robbed it of its effectiveness as a tool for addressing the unspeakable injustice being visited on the ethnic 
minorities of the Niger Delta region. Thus, when the application of the derivation principle served the economic 
interests of the majority ethnic groups in the federation of Nigeria, it was emphasized as the primary criteria for 
redistributing federally collected revenue to the federating units. However, with the emergence of oil and gas as 
Nigeria’s main revenue source, the application of the derivation principle was deliberately de-emphasized by the 
Nigerian State as a major criteria for revenue allocation by the centre to the subnational units because the 
immediate beneficiaries of its application are the oil-producing States in the Niger Delta region.   
This article is divided into five sections. The introductory section provides the background to the study. 
Section two examines the geographical and political descriptions of Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region and the 
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ethnography of its peoples. Section three discusses an over-view of the principle of distributive justice within the 
wider context of justice. In section four, the paper addresses the development and application of the principle of 
derivation in Nigerian federation and its effectiveness or otherwise as a tool of distributive justice in Nigeria’s 
federalism. The concluding remarks are contained in section five.  
 
DESCRIPTION OF NIGERIA’S NIGER DELTA  
The fan-shaped ‘Niger delta’ which derives its name from the River Niger is located in the southernmost part of 
Nigeria that borders the Atlantic Ocean. It lies between latitudes (4 and 6)0 north of the equator and longitudes (5 
and 9)0 east of the Greenwich Meridian.1 Its geographical perimeter stretches from the ‘Benin River in the West 
to the Imo River in the East and from the southernmost tip at Palm Point near Akassa to Aboh in the North 
where the Niger River bifurcates into its two main tributaries.’2 Nigeria’s Niger delta region encompasses a 
triangular area of about 70,000km2 out of which about 20,000km2 is wetland along the Atlantic coast. It is 
comprised of four ecological zones, namely coastal barrier islands, mangroves, freshwater swamp forests, and 
lowland rainforests. It is the largest wetland in Africa and the third largest in the world after the Mississippi and 
Pantanal.3  
The first official delineation of Nigeria’s Niger delta by the British colonial government was contained 
in the Proclamation issued by the Governor-General of Nigeria in 1959 which declared that the area of the 
‘Niger Delta’ for the purpose of the Niger Delta Development Board shall be — ‘(a) in respect of the Western 
Region, the Western Ijaw Division of Delta Province; and (b) in respect of the Eastern Region, Yenagoa 
Province, Degema Province and the Ogoni Division of Port Harcourt Province.’4  Based on this proclamation it 
can be argued that the Niger delta region in its geographical sense comprises six South-South States of the 
federation, namely Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers respectively which were carved 
out of the administrative provinces and divisions mentioned in the proclamation.   
However, the above colonial delineation of the Niger Delta region has generated controversy over the 
years. According to Ogbogbo, the debate over the exact delineation of the Niger Delta region reflects ‘the 
interests involved at different times and circumstances.’5 Arguably, the discovery of crude oil in the region in 
1956 had politicized the delineation of the Niger delta as the diverse ethnic groups within and outside the region 
jostled for share of the benefits from the new oil industry. This politicization has created two Nigeria’s Niger 
Deltas— the ‘geographical Niger Delta’ and the ‘political Niger Delta.’6   
At the centre of the controversy over the exact delineation of the Niger delta is the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (Establishment) Act, 2000 which establishes the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) and charges it with the responsibility of developing the region.7 Sections 1(2), 2(1)(b) and 
4 of the Act recognise nine federating States as member-states of the commission,  that is to say Abia State,  
Akwa-Ibom State,  Bayelsa State,  Cross River State,  Delta State,  Edo State,  Imo  State,  Ondo State, and 
Rivers State respectively. Having regard to the fact that these nine member-states are recognised as oil-
producing states under s.2 (1) of the Act and that the commission’s statutory mandate is limited to the Niger 
delta under s. 7 thereof, the general tenor of the Act would seem to imply that the Niger delta region now 
comprises the said nine oil-producing States which are situated in the South-South, South-East and South-West 
geo-political zones of the federation.  
It is submitted that the deliberate emphasis placed by the NDDC Act on ‘oil-producing states’ supports 
the interpretation that the Act is concerned primarily with the development of these States some of which are in 
the Niger delta, rather than defining the Niger delta. This interpretation is supported by s.30 of the Act which 
defines ‘member States’ to include the nine States already mentioned ‘and any other oil-producing State.’ Thus, 
                                                           
1 T. T. Tamuno, ‘The Geographical Niger Delta (GND)’ Proceedings of the International Conference on the Nigerian State, 
Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, March 11-13 2008 (Harey Publications Port Harcourt, 2008)917, 918. 
2 Michael Watts, ‘Resource curse? Governmentality, oil and power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria’ (2004) 9 Geopolitics 50, 58; 
Tamuno (n1) 918.  
3  World Bank, ‘Defining an Environmental Development Strategy for the Niger Delta, Vol. 1’ (Industry and Energy 
Operations Division, West Central Africa Department, World Bank, May 25, 1995) 2; Chris B. N. Ogbogbo, ‘Identity Politics 
and Resource Control Conflict in the Niger Delta’ in Bahru Zewde (ed), Society, State and Identity in African History (Forum 
for Social Studies Addis Ababa, 2008) 257.   
4 Proclamation of the Area of the Niger Delta, S. C. L. N. 43 of 1959 dated 26 August 1959; Nigeria (Constitution) 
(Amendment No. 2) Order-in- Council 1959, S. I. No. 1049 of 1959. 
5 Ogbogbo (n3) 257   
6 Kaniye S. A. Ebeku, ‘Oil, Niger Delta and the new development initiative: Some reflections from socio-legal perspective’ 
(2007)19 Sri Lanka JIL 1, 4; Tamuno (n1) 918; Augustine A. Ikein, ‘Introduction to Nigeria and the Politics of Niger Delta 
Development’ in Augustine A. Ikein et al., (eds), Oil, democracy and the promise of true federalism in Nigeria (University 
Press of America, Maryland 2008) 1, 15-6. 
7 No. 6 of 2000, Cap.N86 L. F. N. 2004; the Act repealed the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission 
(Establishment etc.) Decree No. 23 of 1992. 
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every oil-producing State qualifies as a member-state of the commission irrespective of its geographical location. 
Therefore, if a State in Northern Nigeria becomes oil-producing such State will qualify as a member-state of the 
NDDC although it will be palpably ridiculous to refer to such State as a Niger delta State in the geographical 
sense of the term. In other word, the fact that a State of the federation is a member-state of the NDDC does not 
ipso facto make that State a Niger delta State. States of the Niger delta region are therefore, not coterminous with 
member-states of the NDDC.   
Perhaps, it was in order to avoid this confusion that the repealed Oil Minerals Producing Areas 
Development Commission (Establishment etc.) Decree 1992 had merely described the area of the jurisdiction of 
the commission, the precursor of the NDDC, as the ‘oil-producing areas’ rather than the Niger delta.  
The conclusion to be drawn from the NDDC Act is that its short title is misleading to the extent that it 
suggests that every member-state of the commission is a Niger delta State. It is respectfully submitted that given 
that the only condition for membership of the commission is that a State must be oil-producing, the description 
of every oil-producing member-state of the commission as a Niger delta State reflects the political delineation of 
the Niger delta. This political delineation which is for development and administrative purposes would appear to 
reflect the current description of the Niger delta as encompassing two Igbo-speaking States of Abia and Imo and 
the predominately Yoruba-speaking State of Ondo respectively.   
Given the two meanings attached to Nigeria’s Niger Delta — the geographical Niger delta and the 
political or administrative Niger delta —this paper has opted for the geographical delineation of the Niger delta 
because it is only in this sense that the region has become coterminous with Nigeria’s southern ethnic minorities. 
Within the context of this research therefore, Nigeria’s Niger Delta region covers the six federating States of 
Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers respectively.  
The Niger Delta encompasses 60% of Nigeria’s coastline and about 2.77% of her total land mass.1 Prior 
to the discovery of oil, the economy of the region depended on fishing and farming. As Ikporukpo has rightly 
pointed out, the ‘network of creeks and rivers of the delta and the coastal seas provide the basis for a peasant 
fishing industry.’2 While the mangrove swamp area of the outer delta depended on fishing, subsistence and 
commercial farming flourished in the rain forests of the inner delta area which was famous for large scale rubber 
and palm plantations. As a matter of fact, before the discovery of oil the Niger delta was the chief source of palm 
oil on the West African coast which formed one of Nigeria’s leading export commodities.3 It was on this peasant 
economy that Nigeria’s oil and gas industry came to be superimposed.  
In terms of ethnography, the Niger delta boasts a profusion of ethno-linguistic diversities. It is the 
traditional homeland to more than forty ethnic groups which include Ijaw, Ibibio, Efik, Ogoni, Urhobo, Itsekiri, 
Isoko, Ishan, Andoni (Obolo), Ibani, Kalabari, Okrika, Ikwerre, Edo, and Anioma. These ethnic groups fall into 
different linguistic groups. Kay Williamson identified five major linguistic groups in the delta: Ijoid, Yoruboid-
Akokoid, Edoid, Igboid, and Delta-Cross, each group encompassing a vast number of ethno-linguistic 
communities.4 
The population of the States in the Niger delta region of the federation is put at 21,044,081 people out 
of Nigeria’s current population of 140,431,790.5 This represents about 14.98% of the national population. It 
cannot be disputed that in a federation dominated by three majority ethnic groups— Hausa/Fulani (North), 
Yoruba (West) and Igbo (East) which account for about two-thirds of the national population, the Niger delta 
peoples belong to the group of ethnic minorities.6  
In strict demographic terms, Nigeria’s ‘ethnic minorities’ may be classified as ethnic groups that do not 
belong to the three majority ethnic groups already mentioned. This implies that in the Nigerian federation 
comprising about 250 ethnic groups, 247 of the groups including all the Niger delta ethnic groups constitute 
ethnic minorities.  
However, this is not the only sense in which the term ‘ethnic minorities’ is used. The term also has a 
functional meaning. Within the context of Nigeria’s multi-ethnic federation, a functional  classification of ethnic 
                                                           
1 World Bank (n3) 9; Nick Ashton-Jones, The human ecosystems of the Niger Delta: An ERA handbook (Environmental 
Rights Action, Benin City 1998) 1. 
2 C. O. Ikporukpo, ‘Petroleum exploitation and the socio-economic environment in Nigeria’ (1983) 21 International Journal 
of Environmental Studies 193. 
3 K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885 (OUP, London 1956) 50.  
4 Kay Williamson, ‘Linguistic Evidence for the Prehistory of the Niger Delta’ in E. J. Alagoa et al. (eds), The Early History of 
the Niger Delta (Helmut Buske Verlag Hamburg 1988) 65, 69. 
5 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Extraordinary Gazette No. 2, Vol. 96 of February 2, 2009 containing the Legal Notification on 
Publication of 2006 Census Final Results.   
6Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (13 August 2013) <http://www.cia.gov/librarythe-world-/publications/ 
factbook/geo/ni.html/>accessed 21 August 2013; Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
‘Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into The Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them’ (Cmnd 505, 
London 1958) para 4.  
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minorities must take into consideration not only distinct cultural identity and comparative demographic size but 
also socio-political and economic standing of the groups measured in terms of their level of participation in the 
political and economic affairs of the federation. From this perspective ethnic minorities are historically, 
linguistically, culturally, and territorially distinct ethnic groups which have by reason of their comparatively 
small demographic size been subjected ‘to subordinate political, social and economic positions in the federation 
and its constituent units.’1   
The Niger delta ethnic groups are clearly minorities in this functional sense. As numerically inferior 
groups, they are considered minor-stakeholders in the federation and subjected to domination and 
marginalization by the majority groups in the political, economic and social spheres. To be sure, one sphere of 
public life where the domination has manifested is in the application of the principle of derivation as a fiscal tool 
for revenue allocation by the central government to the federating units.   
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE  
The concept of distributive justice is best examined within the wider concept of justice. The concept of justice 
has dominated the greater part of human history.  It is an ideal that every man lays claim to. It is the permanent 
passion of public life.  Every policy maker claims it.  It is the terminus ad quem of private life as well.  Every 
litigant claims it. It is the focal point of humanity.2  Courts of law also claim the dispensation of justice as their 
primary goal or essence. Sir William Scott re-echoed the point in Evans v. Evans, when he observed that, 
“Humanity is the second virtue of courts but undoubtedly, the first is justice.”3 The Holy Bible itself talks about 
justice and the means of achieving it in several passages. For instance, in the Book of Deuteronomy, the 
following imperishable passage is found: 
Thou shall appoint judges and magistrates in all thy towns which the Lord they God 
shall give thee, in all thy tribes: that they may judge the people with just judgment, 
you shall not pervert justice you shall not show partiality and you shall not take a 
bribe for a bribe blinds the eye of the wise and subverts the course of righteousness. 
Justice and justice, you shall follow, that you may live and inherit the land which the 
Lord your God gives you.”4 
In one of the earliest discovered written secular Code, King Hammurabi (about 1628 – 1686 BC.) of 
Babylon claimed that his purpose for giving the Code to his people was to make justice appear in the land, to 
destroy the evil and the wicked in order that the strong might not oppress the weak.5 The centrality of justice to 
humanity and to our national polity is reaffirmed by the provisions of section 14(1) of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) which provides that: “The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be 
a State based on the principles of democracy and social justice.”Similar lofty declarations are contained in the 
Preambles to the United Nations Charter and the Constitution of the United States of America, 1787.   
Our courts have repeatedly affirmed the right of every citizen to justice. For instance, the Court of 
Appeal has held that “it is the inalienable right of every citizen to get justice dispensed to him freely in all cases 
in which he is involved.”6 In Amaechi v. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), it was held by the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria that all courts in Nigeria “have a duty which flows from a power granted by the 
Constitution of Nigeria to ensure that citizens of Nigeria, high and low get the justice which their case 
deserves.”7 
From the foregoing, it is submitted, that the centrality of justice in society cannot be over-emphasized.  
Justice is indeed the mirror of civilization of any society.  St. Augustine was therefore right when he declared 
that, “Remove justice and what are kingdoms but gangs of criminals on a large scale.”8 However, in spite of 
man’s unrelenting quest for justice, justice has remained in short supply in virtually every society and its 
attainment is even becoming increasingly idealistic.  
The foregoing leads me to the question; what is justice? Etymologically, the word “justice” is of Latin 
                                                           
1 Eghosa E. Osaghae, ‘Managing Multiple Minority Problems in a Divided Society: The Nigerian Experience’ (1998)36 
Journal of Modern African Studies 1, 3-4; P. Agbese, ‘Federalism and the Minority Question in Nigeria’ in Aaron T. Gana and 
Samuel G. Egwu (eds), Federalism in Africa: The imperative of democratic development, Vol. 1 (Africa World Press Inc., 
Eritrea 2003) 237, 239.  
2 See Hon. Justice Chukwudifu Oputa, “Justice for All Nigerian Womanhood and the Human Side of Justice” (Being Paper 
delivered at the 2nd Annual Chief (Dr) Nabo B. Graham-Douglas (SAN) Memorial Lecture, Rivers State University of 
Science and Technology, Nkpolu-Port Harcourt, 1990) 11.   
3 (1790) Hagg Con. Rep 36.  
4 Deut. 16: 18-20. 
5 Cited in T. A. Aguda, “The Crisis of Justice” (Eresu Hills Publishers, 1986) 5.  
6 Ekerete v. U. B. A. PLC [2005] 9 N. W. L. R. (Pt. 930) 401, 420.  
7 [2008] 5 N. W. L. R. (Part 1080) 227, 324.  
8 Cited in Hon. Justice C. A. Oputa, “The Law and the Twin Pillars of Justice” (Government Printers Owerri, 1981) 3. 
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origin. It is derived from the Latin word “Justitia.” Comprised in the concept of “Justitia” are “Justus” which 
means lawful, rightful, just etc. and “Jus” which means law, right etc.1 Therefore, in its ordinary signification the 
term ‘justice’ encompasses inter-alia, the followings: 
(i) The quality of being righteous, 
(ii) Honesty, impartiality and fairness, 
(iii) Sound reason, validity, rightfulness, 
(iv) The use of authority and power to uphold what is right just and lawful, 
(v) The administration of law in the process of adjudications; the procedure of the courts, 
(vi) The reward of virtue and punishment of vice. Justice is rooted in sincere feeling for man. 
Justice accepts the dignity and worth of the human person. Properly defined therefore, 
justice is that virtue which accepts every human being as a person and then renders to such 
person his or her due.  Rendering to every man his or her due is thus the imperishable 
classical formulation of the concept of justice.2    
As a concept which involves “at its centre the notion of an allotment of something to persons— duties, 
goods, offices, opportunities, penalties, punishments, privileges, roles, status, and so on”,3 justice emphasizes 
fairness or equity. In relation to the dispensation of justice by courts of law, justice enjoins that the parties to 
litigation are fairly treated and receive a fair deal from the courts without any element of bias.4  
Perhaps, one of the best formulations of the concept of justice was offered by John Rawls who defined justice in 
terms of twin principles of equality and fairness as follows: 
The first statement of the two principles reads as follows: 
First, each person is to have an equal right to extensive basic liberty compatible with 
a similar liberty for others. 
Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both; 
(a) reasonably expected to be to every one’s advantage; and 
(b) attached to positions and offices open to all. 
The second principle applies, in the first approximation, to the distribution of 
income and wealth and to the design of organizations that make use of differences in 
authority and responsibility, or chains of command. While the distribution of wealth 
and income needs not be equal, it must be to every one’s advantage, and at the same 
time, positions of authority and offices of command must be accessible to all.5 
Thus, while it is conceded that equality and fairness represent the basic indicia of justice as postulated 
by John Rawls, the point must be made that the views of John Rawls are not free from controversies. This is so 
because justice is basically a moral value and its formulation varies from person to person. 6 It is for this reason 
that justice has also been simply defined as what the right minded members of the community— those who have 
the right spirit within them believe to be fair.7  
 The concept of distributive justice like the broader concept of justice is not susceptible to any precise 
formulation. However, what is certain as pointed out by Aristotle is that the concept operates in the public sphere 
by demanding the state as the allocator of rights, benefits, rewards and burdens to act fairly and equitably thus 
contrasting with corrective justice which prescribes corrective principle in private transactions.8  
Distributive justice is concerned with the ‘just distribution of benefits and burdens among a group of 
people.’9 The rationale for the concept derives from the fact that since resources and other divisible assets of the 
community are scare, every social system must devise a mechanism for allocating these resources among the 
competing constituent groups. The theories of distributive justice, therefore, prescribe guidelines on how a 
community treats its members with respect to assignment of benefits and burdens according to some standards of 
                                                           
1 See generally Oputa (n 15) 12-13.  
2 Hon. Justice C. A. Oputa, In the Eyes of the Law (Friends Law Publishers Limited, 1992) 15-20;  
3 W. K. Frankena, “The Concept of Social Justice” in R. B. Brandt (ed), Social Justice (Prentice-Hall, Engle Wood Cliff, N.J. 
1962) 1, 9.  
4 See generally,  Carribean Trading & Fidelity Corporation v. N. N. P. C. [1992] 7 N. W. L. R. (Pt. 252) 161, 182; First Bank 
of Nigeria PLC v. May Medical Clinics & Diagnostic Centre Ltd., [2006] 4 N. W. L. R. (Pt. 971) 442, 478-479; Omabuwa v. 
Owhofatsho [2006] 5 N. W. L. R. (972) 40, 62.  
5 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness” (April 1958) 67 Philosophical Review 164; John Rawls, “Distributive Justice: Some 
Agenda” (1968) Natural Law Forum Paper 138< http://sholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_ forum/ 
138> accessed 07 August, 2015.  
6 Dennis Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Penguin Books, 1964) 117.  
7 Hon. Justice Kayode Eso, Thoughts on Law and Jurisprudence (MIJ Professional Publishers Limited, 1990) 138; Emesim v. 
Nwachukwu [1999]6 NWLR (Pt. 605) 154, 168; Edun v. Odan Community (1980) 9-11 S. C. 103; Willoughby v. International 
Merchant Bank ( Nig) Ltd., [1987] 1 N. W. L. R. (Pt. 48) 105, 121.  
8 Martin Ostwald (tr), Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Book V (Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1962) paras. 3: 1131a‒4:1132b.  
9Norman E. Bowie, Towards a New Theory of Distributive Justice (The University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst 1971) 4.  
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fairness.1 In other words, the theories of distributive justice ‘specify the conditions under which particular 
distributions (and, more recently, distributional procedures) are perceived to be “just” or “fair.”2  
Central to the theories of distributive justice, therefore, is the notion of fair allocation of benefits and 
burdens by the state. This involves some form of evaluative judgment to determine the correlation between each 
‘individual’s ratio of rewards to investments, or share of rewards to share of investments, or the difference 
between rewards and investments, or some similar method.’3  The correspondence of rewards to investments 
may be perceived as just or unfair depending on the method adopted in the evaluation.  
The search for the most acceptable criteria for determining the standard of ‘fair allocation’ in any 
distributive scheme had led several political scientists, economists, philosophers, and psychologists over the past 
three centuries to develop different theories of distributive justice including egalitarianism, utilitarianism and 
socialism amongst others. Since a discussion of all the theories of distributive justice seems out of place in the 
present work, only a brief discussion of the egalitarian and utilitarian theories is undertaken herein. The choice of 
these two formulas of distributive justice is informed by the fact that apart from being the most dominant in the 
literature, most other theories of distributive justice are indeed, either a modification or an adaptation of them.4  
For instance, Rawls’ ‘difference principle’ which demands: (i) equality in the distribution of political and civil 
liberties; and (ii) equality in the distribution of social and economic goods and services subject to the 
qualification that inequalities in the distribution of social and economic goods and services could be justified if 
they work to the benefit of the least advantaged, is an adaptation of the equality principle on which the 
egalitarian theory is founded.5  
The utilitarian theory of distributive justice postulates that in any given distributional situation 
involving public goods and services or the good things of life (utility), that distribution which provides the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number is the one which is just. In other words, every distribution should be 
founded on the rule of the greatest good of the greatest number.6 Applying this rule to Nigeria’s distributive 
federalism, that distribution of the benefits from natural resources which provides the greatest happiness to the 
greatest number of the constituent groups within the federation is the one that is just. 
It is clear that to the extent that the utilitarian theory of distributive justice places emphasis on the 
‘greatest good for the greatest number’ in any distributional situation, other competing values such as the 
peculiar circumstances of the different groups, their level of contribution to the production process, the 
disproportionate pains they experience and their peculiar needs are bound to be sacrificed on the altar of the 
‘greatest good for the greatest number.’ It is submitted that a distribution that ignores these weighty values is 
bound to inflict maximum pains on minority groups and is therefore unjust and inequitable. These limitations of 
utilitarianism render it inadequate as a theoretical framework for reworking Nigeria’s distributive federalism.  
This leads me to a brief examination of the egalitarian theory of distributive justice. Egalitarianism is 
founded on the principle of equality. According to this principle, the distribution of public goods and services 
which can be considered just is that which distributes them equally amongst the recipients.  ‘According to the 
rule of arithmetical equality’ writes Ryan, ‘all persons who contribute to the product should receive the same 
amount of remuneration.’7  Ryan was however, quick to point out that this rule may seem ‘unjust because it 
would treat unequals equally.’ This is because:  
Although men are equal as moral entities, as human persons, they are unequal in 
desires, capacities, and powers. An income that would fully satisfy the needs of one 
man would meet only 75 per cent., or 50 per cent., of the capacities of another.  To 
allot them equal amounts of income would be to treat them unequally with regard to 
the requisites of life and self-development. To treat them unequally in these matters 
would be to treat them unequally as regards the real and only purpose of property 
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rights. That purpose is welfare. Hence the equal moral claims of men which 
admittedly arise out of their moral equality must be construed as claims to equal 
degrees of welfare, not to equal amounts of external goods.1  
The generic character of the concept of ‘equality’ which provides the moral plank for the egalitarian 
theory informed the subsequent efforts geared toward reformulating the theory to reflect the varying 
circumstances of the recipients without completely jettisoning the requirement of equality. A number of 
allocation principles or rules have emerged from these efforts. The ‘equity rule’ (also called the ‘contribution or 
merit rule’) demands equality of outcome/input ratios or equality relative to individual contributions.2 Under this 
allocation principle, individual’s contribution (ability and performance) forms a cardinal yardstick for 
distributing goods. And given that contribution is usually unequal, Scott et al., have argued that ‘merit is most 
often a justification for inequality.’3 The ‘needs rule’ emphasizes equality of outcomes taking into account the 
need and/or desert of the recipients. It seeks to eliminate inequalities by prescribing equal needs as the basis for 
equal distribution.4   
The principle of rank order equality formulated by Homans is also relevant for our present purposes. 
The principle of rank order equality is formulated thus: ‘If the costs of the members of one group are higher than 
those of another, distributive justice requires that their rewards should be higher too.’ 5  Clearly, Homans’ 
principle of rank order equality recognises inequalities in distributional situations based on the comparative costs 
of each group. This recognition drives his argument that distributive justice is one of the crucial conditions of 
group equilibrium because it involves a situation of ‘felt justice.’6   
Although the existing research in the area of distributive justice has focused on the distribution of social 
and economic goods and services including income, education, medical care, and housing, it is very arguable 
that some of the existing allocation principles, particularly the principle of rank order equality can be applied to 
the distribution of benefits or revenue derived from natural resources between levels of government. In this sense, 
the principle can serve as a mechanism for redressing perceived injustice against the oil-producing ethnic 
minorities in the Niger Delta region of Nigerian federation. The application of these principles would involve a 
consideration of the contributions made by the oil-producing ethnic minorities of the federation to the ‘baking of 
the national cake,’ the costs of such contributions, the prevailing ratios of rewards to costs and the attendant 
inequities. 
It is submitted that the application of the principles of distributive justice to the restructuring of 
Nigeria’s current system of fiscal federalism can be justified on a number of grounds. First, s. 14(1) of the 1999 
Constitution declares that ‘The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a State based on the principles of democracy 
and social justice.’ Section 17(1) of the Constitution further reaffirms that the State ‘social order is founded on 
ideals of freedom, equality and justice.’ In furtherance of these ideals, s.15 (4) of the Constitution declares that 
‘The State shall foster a feeling of belonging and of involvement among the various peoples of the Federation, to 
the end that loyalty to the nation shall override sectional loyalties.’ Given that distributive justice actually 
embraces ‘the whole economic dimension of social justice’,7 it stands to reason that in principle, distributive 
justice forms one of the corner stones of Nigerian federalism. 
Secondly, the quest for justice is central to the agitations by different ethnic nationalities, particularly 
ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta for the restructuring of Nigeria’s federation to provide for greater space for 
self-rule by the constituent units. The domination and marginalisation of ethnic minorities by the majority groups 
and the entrenched fear that the former would not have their just deserts in the federal union are the major 
pathologies of Nigeria’s federalism. Only an equity theory could provide an enduring answer to these problems 
which have continued to retard the development of a strong and stable Nigerian federation.  
Finally, it is generally accepted that the ‘legitimacy of the state and its leaders depends in large measure 
on their perceived justice, and legislation and public policy are judged in terms of their procedural and 
distributive justice.’8 Therefore, the perception of the justice or injustice of Nigeria’s federal system in terms of 
the current fiscal arrangement is a crucial factor in any efforts geared toward building a stable Nigerian 
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federation and engendering a sense of national loyalty among the diverse ethnic groups.  
It is against the foregoing background that the next section of this paper will briefly examine the 
adverse ecological, environmental and social impacts of oil and gas exploration and production in the Niger 
Delta since the 1950’, the horrendous deprivations being suffered by its peoples and the extent to which the 
application of the principle of derivation has addressed the disproportionate contributions of the region to the 
sustenance of the Nigerian State.  
 
THE ADVERSE ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC IMACTS OF OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION 
AND PRODUCTION IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION 
The ethnic groups of the Niger Delta region have had serious grievances against the Nigerian state which are 
traceable to the discovery and exploitation of hydrocarbons in their territory since 1956. According to Osaghae, 
foremost amongst these grievances is that ‘although the bulk of crude oil, the country’s main source of revenue 
is derived from their lands, they belong to the ranks of the most backward and politically marginalized groups in 
the country.’1  The Niger delta ethnic groups traced this horrendous injustice to the fact that they are ethnic 
minorities in a federation dominated by the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups. The result is that the 
oil wealth generated from the region is used to develop other regions of the country inhabited by the majority 
ethnic groups while the Niger delta is left to grapple with the perennial lack of basic infrastructure and amenities 
which are taken for granted in other parts of the federation.2   
Second is that oil exploitation spanning over five decades has left in its trail severe environmental 
degradation, despoliation of the ecosystem and destruction of the peasant economy of the region built on fishing 
and farming thereby exposing the people to severe health hazards, economic hardship and social dislocation.3  
To be sure, the above grievances are not misplaced. The Minorities’ Commission set up by the 
erstwhile British colonial government had as far back as 1958 found that the ‘needs of those who lived in the 
creeks and swamps of the Niger delta’ were ‘very different from those of the interior’ and that the Niger delta 
was ‘poor, backward and neglected.’4 Although the Commission recommended the creation of a ‘special area’ in 
the Niger delta and the establishment of a Federal Board to direct the development of the region into channels 
which would meet its peculiar problems, the region has remained poor, underdeveloped and neglected to an 
extent that suggests that the Commission’s description of the Niger delta as ‘poor, backward and neglected’ is as 
true today as it was in 1958.  
While it is generally acknowledged that  the Niger delta terrain which causes seasonal flooding of over 
80 per cent of the region ‘including all of the swamp forest, except the riverbank levees’5 poses peculiar 
environmental problems, it would be naïve to treat the underdevelopment of the region as a natural consequence 
of its deltaic terrain. The truth of the matter is that the underdevelopment of the region is the result of decades of 
wilful neglect by a distant central government dominated by the majority ethnic groups. The result is that the 
region though rich in natural resources is paradoxically one of the poorest regions of the world. 
A  Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) painted  a shocking but true picture 
of the Niger delta: ‘In reality, the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social 
infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and 
endemic conflict.’6 The Report chronicled the lack of basic infrastructure and amenities in the region such as 
electricity, roads, schools, hospitals, potable water, and housing and concluded that although oil wealth enriches 
Nigeria as a country, ‘it has not alleviated the grinding poverty, neglect and deprivation in the region that 
produces it.’7 
The findings in the UNDP’s Report are amply supported by a number of other reports and studies 
including those commissioned by the federal government.8 Attention may be drawn here to just two of such 
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reports.  The Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta discussed the infrastructural poverty of the 
Niger Delta communities and concluded that: 
They still lack basic facilities and amenities that are taken for granted in other parts 
of the country. In particular, the creeks and riverine areas still look worse than the 
fourth world by whatever development indicators that may be applied. Some of the 
riverine communities cannot be accessed by road, have no school, clinic or any form 
of electricity. Public officials do not get to these communities for years and do not 
have any reasonable sensitivity to their conditions of living. No doubt, this has 
contributed to the violent agitations and provided safe havens for the militants . . .  
The absence of such infrastructure in a region that produces so much wealth and 
opportunities for the nation has continued to prick the conscience of many and 
contaminate opportunities for building national harmony and a sense of citizenship.1  
The Report by Amnesty International is no less damning in its vivid description of the striking contrast between 
the enormous resource wealth of the Niger delta and its shocking underdevelopment and neglect:  
Oil has generated an estimated $600 billion since the 1960s. Despite this, the 
majority of the Niger delta’s population lives in poverty. . .  The majority of the 
people of the Niger delta do not have adequate access to clean water or health care. 
Their poverty, and its contrast with the wealth generated by oil, has become one of 
the world’s starkest and most disturbing examples of the ‘resource curse.’2  
Similarly, a recent report released by the National Bureau of Statistics confirmed that the Niger delta 
(south-south geo-political zone) remains one of the poorest geo-political zones in the federation with a poverty 
rate of 63.8 per cent; and in terms of dollar per day measure of poverty, all the States in the region except Edo 
are below the national average.3 Although the report also showed that poverty is more extreme in the North with 
North-West and North-East geo-political zones recording poverty rates of 77.7 per cent and 76.3 per cent 
respectively, the truth of the matter according to the Human Rights Watch, is that the divisions ‘between the rich 
and poor are more obvious in the areas where gas flares light up the night sky.’4  
The region also lags behind on the Human Development Index (HDI) score which represents a 
composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development —long and 
healthy life as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge as measured by adult literacy rate; and a decent 
standard of living as measured by Gross Domestic Product per capita.5 According to the UNDP the region’s 
HDI’s score remains at a low value of 0.564 which puts it far below countries or regions with similar oil and gas 
resources.6  
Although Ross has attempted to rationalise the poverty in the oil-rich Niger delta by reference to a 
cluster of economic and political ailments plaguing resource-rich countries such as retarded economic growth, 
prevalence of corruption, higher risks of political instability, and widespread poverty, 7  it is respectfully 
submitted that the case of the Niger delta is clearly one of ethnic marginalization and domination. If the vast 
wealth generated from oil in the region could be deployed to develop several multi-billion naira projects in 
different regions of the country including the new federal capital city of Abuja in spite of the ‘resource curse’, it 
seems difficult to justify the backwardness of the region by reference to any theoretical prescription other than 
the conspiracy of the three majority ethnic groups.  
To be sure, apart from infrastructural and human poverty, the region also suffers from severe 
environmental degradation arising from decades of petroleum exploration and exploitation. There is a widely 
received view that the process of petroleum exploration and production generally impacts adversely on the 
environment although the degree of environmental impact is ‘determined by operator responsibility, government 
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oversight and conditions in particular ecosystems.’1 It is common ground that while a number of public agencies 
are charged with regulating, supervising and monitoring Nigeria’s oil and gas industry and the environment at 
large, ‘these agencies are, for the most part, ill-equipped, poorly financed, corrupt, and lack requisite regulatory 
capacity and expertise.’2 Apart from the lack of an effective environmental regulatory mechanism, there is also 
concern over the lack of political will by the central government to enforce extant regulations, particularly when 
the international oil companies are involved. The result is that the Niger delta has been rendered far more 
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of petroleum exploration and exploitation. 
Quite expectedly, a study carried out by an independent team of experts drawn from Nigeria, the UK 
and the USA has found that the Niger delta is ‘one of the 5 most severely petroleum damaged ecosystems in the 
world’ and that the devastation of the region ‘may even be worse than other notoriously impacted regions such 
as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Siberia, and Ecuador.’3 The Report described the environmental damage to the Niger 
delta as ‘chronic and cumulative’ and that it has acted ‘synergistically with other sources of environmental stress 
to result in a severely impaired coastal ecosystem and compromised the livelihoods and health of the region’s 
impoverished residents.’4 The report also found that the environmental devastation of the Niger delta occurs at 
every stage of the extractive activities, particularly during exploration, production, transportation, and refining:  
Oil and gas activities have caused damage in several forms to the Delta.  In 
exploration, seismic lines have cleared significant forest areas, and seismic crews 
have generated thousands of tons of waste, all disposed untreated directly into the 
ecosystem.  In production, there is a considerable amount of dredging and filling of 
the water ways, siltation, sulfidic dredge spoils leading to acidification of water 
bodies, erosion, spills (well blowouts and facility failures), pollution from gas and 
associated oil flaring, discharge of huge amounts of production water containing 
significant quantities of hydrocarbons, and drilling mud discharges. In 
transportation, laying of several thousand miles of oil and gas pipelines across Delta 
habitats has resulted in significant habitat damage and loss, pipeline and tanker spills, 
and storage tank spills. And in refining, toxic sludge discharges and process spills 
pollute waterways, flaring and stack emissions pollute the atmosphere, and refined 
products (particularly petrochemicals) further enter the ecosystem.5  
Dealing specifically with oil spills which form the major source of pollution, the Report concluded that 
‘an estimated 9 million -13 million barrels (1.5 million tons) of oil had spilled in the Niger delta ecosystem over 
the past 50 years representing about 50 times the estimated volume spilled in the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in 
Alaska in 1989.’6  
While it is conceded that there is a dearth of comprehensive data on the cumulative spills recorded each 
year in the Niger delta, available statistics suggest that the above conclusion is well founded. One study has 
shown that a total of 4,835 spills occurred in the region over the period 1976-1996 resulting in a cumulative spill 
volume of 2,446,322 spills. Of this amount, only about 15.91 per cent was recovered; implying that about 84.09 
per cent of the spill was lost to the environment.7 The UNDP on its part estimated that a total of 6,817 oil spills 
occurred in the region between 1976 and 2001 resulting in the loss of approximately 3 million barrels of crude 
oil more than 70 per cent of which was not recovered. Approximately 6 per cent spilled on land, 25 per cent in 
swamps and the remaining 69 per cent in offshore environment.8 The SPDC reported an average of 221 spills 
yearly between 1989 and 1994 involving some 7, 350 barrels of crude oil lost to the environment annually. From 
2005 to 2009, SPDC recorded an average of 175 spill incidents involving its facilities yearly. A marginal 
increase in spill incidents involving SPDC facilities was recorded in 2012 with a total of 198 spills. About 32% 
of the spilled volume from SPDC facilities in 2012 was lost to the environment.9  
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Although the Niger delta communities have consistently disagreed with the IOCs over the causes of 
these spills, their adverse impacts on the residents and the entire ecosystem cannot be disputed.1 Oil spills on 
land destroy crops and damage the quality and productivity of the soil. A recent study carried out by the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in Ogoni land has found that when oil reaches the root zone, crops 
and other plants begin to experience stress and can die and the effect can last as long as 40 years despite repeated 
clean-up attempts.2 Oil spills in water affect mangrove forests, kill aquatic and marine lives including fauna and 
flora and contaminate sources of drinking water. The most serious case of groundwater contamination was found 
in Ogoni land close to a Nigerian National Company Product pipeline where an 8cm layer of refined oil was 
observed floating on the groundwater which serves the community wells.3 Thus, oil pollution is linked to 
infections such as diarrhoea, dysentery, gastro-enteritis, and whooping cough.4  
Oil exploration has also impacted adversely on the traditional peasant economy of the Niger delta. For 
instance, through the use of explosives, provision of new routes and pits and stream diversion during the process 
of prospecting for oil, fishing grounds and farm lands are put out of use thus depriving the local population 
access to ancestral farmlands and fishing grounds. Furthermore, explosives destroy marine and aquatic lives 
within the areas of impact. Lastly, gas flaring which still goes on in the Niger delta ‘creates a microclimate 
around that hinders the survival of both plants and animals alike.’5 These activities have led to poor fishing and 
farming yields, dwindling fortune among the local population and a local economy that is completely destroyed. 
A learned writer has therefore rightly argued that the adverse impacts of the oil industry in the Niger delta could 
best be summed up in ‘three D’s: deprivation, despoliation and destitution.’6 
What clearly emerges from the foregoing is that the ethnic minorities of the Niger delta have not only 
borne the costs of oil exploration and exploitation in the region disproportionately but have also been denied the 
benefits derived from these activities. Quite expectedly, the common perception amongst the peoples of the 
region is that ‘all the oil wealth has leaked out, leaving people impoverished and neglected.’7 Thus, the Niger 
Delta has suffered from decades of criminal neglect and injustice. The question whether the principle of 
derivation has adequately addressed these injustices will be examined in the next section of this paper.  
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF DERIVATION   
The principle of derivation as one of the constitutionally prescribed criteria for distributing federally-collected 
revenue between the federal and state governments prescribes that a pre-determined percentage of federally-
collected revenue derived from a state of the federation shall be returned to the state as a form of compensation 
for its contribution to federal finance.8 In other words, the derivation principle seeks to strike a balance between 
the contributions made by the respective states of the federation to federally-collected revenue and their share of 
revenue from the total federal receipts. As the 1994-1995 Constitutional Conference stated it:  
Derivation is a factor of fiscal federalism which ensures that each unit of 
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government contributes to the national coffers and receives equitably in return 
through revenue allocation. Each unit is, therefore, encouraged to work hard in 
baking a larger national cake from which it receives in proportion to its contribution. 
Derivation is, therefore, basically a reward for noble efforts of revenue generation. 
However, that is not all; derivation can also be seen as compensation for the loss in 
revenue or other economic activities through the utilisation of the land of any unit of 
governments [or communities] for national resource generation. Still derivation can 
be utilised for upgrading and reclaiming land degraded in the process of mineral 
exploitation and exploration. Derivation can also be put in place as payment usually 
in rent for the use of land and/or payment for exploring mineral from the land…1  
Although the application of the derivation principle dates back to the recommendation of the Sydney 
Phillipson Commission of 1946, its use as a specific fiscal tool for redistributing revenue derived from natural 
resources to the mineral-producing regions can be traced to the recommendations made by Sir Louis Chick who 
was appointed Fiscal Commissioner by the London Constitutional Conference to advise the government on the 
financial implications of the proposed new constitutional arrangements for Nigeria. Sir Louis Chick 
recommended that the whole of the net proceeds of mining royalties derived from minerals (extracted from the 
Northern region) should be allocated to the region from which the taxed minerals were extracted in accordance 
with the principle of derivation, that is allocating revenue to a region in proportion to the region’s contribution to 
central revenue.2 During the Lagos Constitutional Conference, it was agreed that the derivation principle which 
then applied only to solid minerals exploited in Northern Nigeria, should be extended to royalties and rents 
derived from petroleum resources.3 
It is clear, therefore, that the principle of derivation as originally conceived, was not intended for the 
benefit of the oil-producing states or communities of the Niger delta, but rather the Northern region of Nigeria 
which was the mineral-producing region. Thus, Northern Nigeria had enjoyed enhanced revenue allocation from 
the centre based on the principle of derivation long before oil and gas exploitation commenced in the Niger delta.  
The principle of derivation as currently incorporated in the proviso to s.162(2) of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) prescribes that in the application of any approved revenue 
sharing formula for distributing the fund standing to the credit of the Federation Account among the federal and 
state governments and the local governments in each state, not less than thirteen per cent of the revenue accruing 
to the Federation Account from any natural resources shall be distributed to the states from which such natural 
resources were extracted. By operation of this principle, oil-producing states under the current federal system 
receive thirteen per cent (13%) from the Federation Account in respect of revenue derived by the federation from 
oil and gas produced within their respective land and off-shore boundaries. 4  
It is important to point out from the outset that the principle of derivation as incorporated in the 1999 
Constitution (as amended) applies to all revenue derived by the federation of Nigeria from natural resources. The 
practical implication of this is that all oil/gas producing and solid mineral producing states in the federation are 
entitled to enjoy derivation in respect of revenue derived from resource exploitation within their boundaries.  
Derivation, therefore, is not the exclusive preserve of the oil-producing states in the Niger delta. However, the 
association of the derivation principle with the Niger Delta region stems from the fact that oil and gas constitute 
the main source of federal revenue and revenue derived from solid minerals from other regions of the federation 
including Norther Nigeria constitute a very insignificant proportion of total federal revenue.  
It has been argued by Suberu that the derivation principle meets the ‘special claims and needs of the oil-
bearing units.’5 Thus, for Suberu, the application of the derivation principle serves as an effective tool of 
distributive justice in the Niger Delta region of the federation by providing additional fund to the oil-producing 
States from the Federation Account to address the adverse ecological, economic and social impacts of oil 
exploration and exploitation.   
It is submitted that the above view is clearly over-stated. First, being a purely fiscal tool the derivation 
principle does not grant the oil-producing states any right of participation in the control, development and 
management of natural resources located within their boundaries. The derivation principle, therefore, is not 
                                                           
1 Federal Republic of Nigeria (n77) 123, paras 2781-2782; Adedotun Phillips, ‘Nigeria’s Federal Financial Experience’ (1971) 
9 Journal of Modern African Studies 389, 390.  
2 Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘Nigeria: Report of the Fiscal Commissioner on the Financial Effects of the Proposed 
New Constitutional Arrangements’ (Cmd.9026, London 1953) paras.51, 95 (16).   
3 Secretary of State for the Colonies, ‘Report by the Resumed Conference on the Nigerian Constitution held in Lagos in 
January and February, 1954’ (Cmd. 9059, London 1954) para. 12 (ix). 
4 The principle also applies to off-shore resources within 200 metre water depth isobath contiguous to a state of the federation, 
see Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of the Dichotomy in the Application of the Principle of Derivation) Act 2004, s.1 ;  A-G 
Adamawa State v. A-G Federation [2005]18 N. W. L. R (Pt. 958)581, 673-4.   
5Rotimi Suberu, ‘Federalism in Africa: The Nigerian Experience in Comparative Perspective’ (2009) 8 Ethnopolitics 67, 81. 
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coterminous with resource ownership or governance by the oil-producing states.1  
Secondly, deriving from its character as a mere fiscal tool, it is indisputable that the principle of 
derivation does not address the core of the Niger delta agitation which is the participation of the constituent units 
in the control, development and management of natural resources within their boundaries.  To be sure, the 
derivation principle leaves the oil-producing states at the mercy of the federal government in terms of the 
redistribution of revenue derived from natural resources. To this extent, it is arguable that the principle of 
derivation neither advances the preservation of the underlying principles of Nigerian federalism nor the principle 
of self-determination which is central to the resource movement in the region. . 
Thirdly, the application of the principle of derivation has remained highly susceptible to political 
manipulations by the majority ethnic groups in the federation of Nigeria  From 1954-1969 when mineral 
resources (tin and columbite) and agricultural produce (cocoa, groundnut and palm oil) which were derived 
outside of the Niger delta, that is to say from the Northern (Hausa/Fulani), Western (Yoruba) and Eastern (Igbo) 
regions constituted the main foreign exchange earners for the federation, the application of the derivation 
principle was favoured and insisted upon by these three majority ethnic groups as the primary basis for allocating 
centrally-collected revenue between levels of government because it boosted the fiscal capacities of their 
regional governments. Indeed, from 1954-1969 the derivation paid to regional governments with respect to 
revenue derived from minerals, mineral oils and other tax sources varied from hundred per cent to fifty per cent.2  
Interestingly, the irreversible decline in the contribution made by solid minerals and agricultural 
produce derived from the Northern, Western and Eastern regions to the economy and the ascendancy of oil 
derived from the Niger delta as the main foreign exchange earner from the 1970s heralded the distortion in the 
application of the principle of derivation. This systematic distortion is obvious from the preference now accorded 
to other allocation criteria such as equality of states, population, land mass, terrain, and population density with 
the principle of derivation being treated as an appendage to these main allocation criteria. The emphasis placed 
by s.162 (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) on the main allocation criteria, that is to say population, 
population density and land mass implies that the larger the population and land mass of a state the more oil 
revenue is allocated to the state. The result is that non-oil-producing states in Northern and Western Nigeria with 
large population and land mass receive more allocations from oil revenue than the oil-producing states that are 
generally smaller both in terms of population and areal extent.3 
The scant emphasis placed on the derivation principle came to a head when the Okigbo Revenue 
Allocation Commission set up by the federal government explicitly rejected it on the ground that it was divisive.4 
It is very curious that such misconceived claim was not made when the majority ethnic groups benefited 
immensely from the application of the principle before the discovery of oil in the Niger delta. Expectedly, 
therefore, from 1970 when oil became the main source of government revenue, the derivation principle had 
suffered systematic obliteration resulting in its drastic reduction from forty-five per cent in 1970 to zero per cent 
in 1979, one per cent in 1992 and later thirteen per cent in 1999.5 
Fourth, the distortion in the application of the principle of derivation also extends to offshore natural 
resources. Whereas under s. 134(6) of the 1960 Constitution and s. 140(6) of the 1963 Constitution respectively, 
the continental shelf of each region was deemed to be part of that region for purpose of computing the derivation 
principle, the 1999 Constitution does not contain any identical provision. It is very arguable that this deliberate 
omission in the 1999 Constitution (as amended) reflects the long standing objection of the Northern Region of 
Nigeria to the application of the principle of derivation to revenue derived from off-shore petroleum exploitation 
which it perceived favoured the oil-producing littoral states in the Niger delta. The Northern delegation to the Ad 
hoc Conference on Constitutional Proposals for Nigeria had stated the northern objection in its memorandum 
thus:   
In a country following a Federal set up it is the practice of nations upheld by 
decisions of judicial tribunals and opinions of jurists that the minerals in territorial 
waters and continental shelf belong to the whole Federation . . . From the foregoing 
it is clear that the provision in our Constitution treating minerals obtained from the 
continental shelf as if it were extracted from land situate in a Region is a concession 
                                                           
1A-G, Adamawa State (n81)639-640. 
2Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council 1954, s.161; Nigeria (Constitution) (Amendment) Order-in-Council 1959, s.161 (1); 
Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria 1960, s.134; Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria 1963, s. 140.  
3Akpan H. Ekpo, ‘Fiscal Federalism: Nigeria’s Post-Independence Experience, 1960-90’ (1994) 22 World Development 1129, 
1131-4; Chris O.Ikporukpo, ‘Petroleum, Fiscal Federalism and Environmental Justice in Nigeria’ (2004)8 Space and Polity 
321, 332-3. 
4Report of the Presidential Commission on Revenue Allocation, Volume I (Federal Government Printers, Lagos 1980) 
para.360. 
5 Emmanuel O. Ojo, ‘The Politics of Revenue Allocation and Resource Control in Nigeria: Implications for Federal Stability’ 
(2010) 7 Federal Governance 14, 31. 
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which is wrong in principle and out of step with international law and practice.1  
The above objection was restated by the Northern delegates to the just concluded 2014 National 
Conference when they called not only for the reduction of the current thirteen (13) per cent derivation but also 
demanded for the re-introduction of the onshore/off-shore dichotomy in the application of the derivation 
principle. As the delegates put it: 
The North recommends the rejection of claim to oil resources by oil producing areas 
that led to the cancellation of the onshore/offshore oil dichotomy which action gave 
away a national resource to littoral states, seriously eroding revenue available for the 
distribution to all part of the country. The North demands a reversal to status quo 
ante . . .  The derivation which is now at 13 per cent should be reduced to five 
percent and must be limited only to the onshore.2 
Although the enactment of the Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy in the Application of the 
Principle of Derivation) Act 2004 was a bold attempt by the federal government to remedy the injustice 
sanctioned by the 1999 Constitution (as amended), it is submitted that the legislative intervention has not gone as 
far as restoring the exact position laid down under the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions. Unlike the 1960 and 1963 
Constitutions which extended the application of the principle of derivation to natural resources extracted in the 
continental shelf contiguous to the region, s. 1(1) of the Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy in the 
Application of the Principle of Derivation) Act 2004 limits the extension of the seaward boundary of a littoral 
state of the federation to the two hundred metre water depth Isobath contiguous to that state for the purpose of 
the application of the principle of derivation.  
Having regard to the fact that the expression ‘two hundred metre water depth Isobath’ in s.1 (1) of the 
Act refers to a ‘line joining all points off the coast of Nigeria where the waters are two hundred metres deep,’3 it 
would appear that the application of the principle of derivation in relation to offshore resources is limited to 
offshore production occurring between the low-water mark off the coast of Nigeria and the two hundred metre 
water depth thus excluding natural resources extracted from substantial parts of the continental shelf from the 
application of the principle.   
Indeed most of Nigeria’s current offshore operations occur outside the two hundred metre water depth 
off its coast. For instance, Nigeria’s largest deep-water oil field —Bonga field lies in ‘water 1,000 plus metres 
deep across an area of 60 square km.’4 Although this oil field lies within Nigeria’s continental shelf —120 km 
offshore Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea —it is clear that no oil-producing littoral state can claim any derivation 
with respect to  production  from this field which stands at 200,000 bpd and 150 million standard cubic feet of 
gas per day representing 10 per cent of Nigeria’s oil exports.5  
The effect of the Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy in the Application of the Principle of 
Derivation) Act 2004, therefore, is that the bulk of offshore natural resources extracted within the continental 
shelf of Nigeria are excluded from the application of the derivation principle in spite of the fact that production 
activities within the continental shelf had in the past resulted in oil spills such as the December 2011 spill from 
Bonga field which led to 40, 000 barrels of oil spilling into the Atlantic ocean with serious adverse 
environmental impacts on Akwa Ibom State, an oil-producing state in the Niger delta.6      
Fifthly, there is also evidence of inconsistency in the application of the derivation principle which is 
                                                           
1 Memoranda submitted by the delegations to the Ad hoc Conference on Constitutional Proposals for Nigeria (The Nigerian 
National Press Limited, Apapa 1967) 122-123; In A-G., Adamawa State (n81) the 19 northern states challenged the 
constitutionality of the Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy in the Application of the Principle of Derivation) Act 
2004 on the ground that the Act granted ownership of offshore resources within the delimited zone to the littoral states. The 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act as providing for the implementation of the derivation principle rather 
than dealing with transfer of ownership of off-shore natural resources to the littoral states.   
2Cited in Henry Umoru, Joseph Erunke and Levinus Nwabughiogu, ‘Resource control: Northern delegates want derivation 
reduced to 5 %’ Vanguard (Lagos, 30 April 2014) <http://www. vanguardngr.com/2014/04/resource 
-control-northern-delegates-want-derivation-reduced-to-5%/>accessed 05 October 2014; during the abortive National 
Political Reforms Conference 2005/2006, delegates from the oil-producing states had insisted on twenty five per cent 
derivation with a progression to fifty per cent but were countered by delegates from the north who were only willing to 
concede not more than eighteen per cent. The ethnic bitterness generated by this disagreement led to a walk out on the 
conference by the south-south delegates. See UNDP, ‘Niger Delta Human Development Report (UNDP, Abuja 2006) 15-6. 
3 I. E. Sagay, ‘Nigerian Constitutions, Operation of Federalism and the South- South Zone’ Being Keynote Address Delivered 
at the All Niger Peoples Conference, Dallas, Texas, U. S. A. (24-27 August, 2006) 13-
14<http://www.dawodu.com/sagay2.htm/ accessed 20 December 2012. 
4  SPDC, ‘Briefing Notes: Deepwater Nigeria—Bonga Development’ (April 2013)<http://www.s05.static-
shell.com/content/dam/shell-new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/2013bnotes/deepwater.pdf/>accessed 05 August, 2015.   
5 SPDC (n91).  
6BBC News Africa, ‘Shell urged to pay Nigeria $5bn over Bonga oil spill’ (17 July, 2012) <http://www.bbc. 
co.uk/world-africa-18875731> accessed 08 August, 2015.   
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reflected in the different rates of derivation payable by the federal government for oil and gas production from 
the Niger delta on the one hand, and solid minerals extracted from outside the Niger delta on the other. Whereas 
the oil-producing states receive only thirteen per cent derivation for oil and gas, fifty-five per cent is paid as 
derivation to Oyo state, South-West Nigeria (Yoruba) in respect of the Igbeti marble resources.1 Ekpo has also 
pointed out that Value Added Tax (VAT), the bulk of which is generated in Lagos (South-West Nigeria) attracts 
twenty per cent derivation as against thirteen per cent for oil and gas.2  
The juxtaposition of the above discriminatory policies of the federal government has continued to fuel 
the general perception in the Niger delta that the distortion of the derivation principle forms part of the 
systematic marginalisation and domination of the oil-producing minorities by the majority ethnic groups.3 A 
former Governor of Rivers State, Milford Okilo, captured the sense of alienation that the politics of derivation 
principle has generated among the delta minorities vividly: 
Derivation as a revenue allocation criterion is not new in this country. It featured 
prominently when cocoa, groundnuts, etc., were the main sources of revenue for 
Nigeria. But it has continued to be deliberately suppressed since crude oil became 
the mainstay of the country’s wealth . . . simply because the main contributors of the 
oil wealth are the minorities.4  
This perception has been further heightened by the refusal of the federal government to take any steps 
toward implementing past reports on the Niger delta which had recommended upward review of the derivation 
principle.5 It is arguable that the manipulation of the principle of derivation by the dominant ethnic groups in 
response to their changing economic interests and the lack of political will on the part of the federal government 
to negotiate any upward review of the thirteen per cent derivation negate any hope that the principle could serve 
as a viable fiscal mechanism for addressing the marginalization of the oil-producing Niger delta region.  
Sixthly, by a practice already struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional, the federal 
government unilaterally makes deductions from the distributable fund in the federation account to service its 
external debts and settle other financial obligations including the operations of the National Oil Corporation 
before distributing the balance among the three tiers of government.6 Through this unconstitutional act the 
distributable fund in the federation account which is available to the states including the oil-producing states 
under the derivation principle is substantially depleted thereby further weakening the application of the 
derivation principle.  The result is that the oil-producing states have not fared any better under derivation 
principle vis-à-vis none oil-producing states of the federation.  
Finally, the derivation principle represents a constitutional legitimization of centralized state ownership 
of natural resources. It seeks to justify federal appropriation of the natural resources in the Niger delta in 
consideration for a form of compensation which creates the misleading impression that the oil-producing states 
are benefitting from resource-extraction within their territory.7 However, the truth of the matter is that the 
thirteen per cent derivation payable to oil-producing states pales into insignificance given the horrendous 
negative ecological, environmental, economic, and social externalities associated with oil production. The 
derivation is grossly insufficient to tackle these externalities, let alone address infrastructural development.  
Besides, as Ejobowah has rightly argued, it ‘does not open up economic space for the subnational governments 
to fend for themselves, and it encourages wastage (corruption) . . .’8 As expected, the derivation principle has 
been ‘rejected in several parts of the Federation in preference for a return to fiscal federalism under which the 
                                                           
1 F. O. Egwaikhide and O. Aregbeyen, ‘Oil production externalities in the Niger Delta: Is fiscal solution feasible?’ in F. O. 
Egwaikhide and O. Aregbeyen (eds), Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria’s Economic Development (The Nigerian Economic 
Society, Ibadan 1999) 101-115. 
2 Akpan H. Ekpo, ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: The Nigerian Experience’ Being paper presented at the 10th Year 
Anniversary of the Financial and Fiscal Commission of South Africa, Cape town International Convention Centre, Cape town, 
South Africa (10-12 August 2004)32. 
3 Lawrence A. Rupley, ‘Revenue Sharing in the Nigerian Federation’ (1981)19 Journal of Modern African Studies 257, 261; 
Adedotun O. Phillips, ‘Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues’ (1991)21 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 
103, 104; I. Oguine, ‘Nigeria’s Oil Revenues and the Oil Producing Areas’ (1999)17 J. Energy & Nat. Resources L. 111, 114-
5.  
4 M. Okilo, ‘The Derivation Principle and National Unity’ Daily Times (Lagos, 19 July 1980) 3. 
5  Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta Vol.1 (November, 2008) 60; Report of the Special Security 
Committee On Oil Producing Areas (September, 2001) 26. 
6 A-G Federation v. A-G Abia State (No. 2) [2000]6 N. W. L. R. (Pt. 764) 542, 760-1, 802. 
7 George Anderson, ‘Nigerian Fiscal Federalism Seen from a Comparative Perspective’ Notes for Address to Governors’ 
Forum’ (Abuja, Nigeria 28 October, 2007)14<http:// www. forumfed.org/en/ pubs/GA_ Governors’ 
Forum_NigeriaOct07.pdf/ >accessed 02 August, 2015. 
8 John Boye Ejobowah, ‘Rewriting Nigerian Federal Constitution: A Prescriptive Argument for Self-Sustaining Arrangement’ 
(2009) 43 Canadian Journal of African Studies 507, 528.  
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federating States . . . owned, controlled and developed the natural resources which were located on their land.’1  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The Niger Delta region of Nigeria has been the epicentre of conflicts and restiveness in the federation since the 
1960’s. The history of conflicts and restiveness in the region are traceable to perceived injustices being suffered 
by its oil-producing ethnic minorities. The agitations in the Niger Delta for resource control or/and the practice 
of fiscal federalism are part and parcel of the collective quest for social justice in the region.  
The principle of derivation has been touted as a fair and just response by the Nigerian State to the 
criminal neglect of the oil-producing Niger Delta. Indeed the general perception in none oil-producing regions of 
the federation is that the application of the derivation principle offers the oil-producing states of the Niger delta 
undeserved access to federally-collected oil revenue to the detriment of none oil-producing states of the 
federation.  However, this paper has demonstrated that the application of the principle of derivation has not 
improved the fortunes of oil-producing states in the light of the horrendous ecological, environmental, social and 
economic externalities associated with natural resource exploration and extraction. Thus, the rewards offered oil-
producing states of the Niger delta region under the derivation principle pales into insignificance when compared 
with the contributions of the region to the baking of the national cake and the deprivations being suffered by its 
peoples.  
The position of this paper therefore is that the application of the principle of derivation is ineffective as 
a tool of distributive justice in the Niger Delta region of the Federation of Nigeria. This clearly renders the 
clamour from Northern Nigeria for a reduction of the derivation principle from the current 13% to 5% highly 
insensitive if not out rightly provocative. What is urgently needed is an upward review of the derivation principle 
from the current 13% to 30% with a further progression to 50% by 2020. The proposed increase is permissible 
under the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which merely specifies the lowest limit of the derivation principle in 
the proviso to s. 162 (2) thereof. The proposed increase will make more funds available to the oil-producing 
states to enable them address the infrastructural deficit in the region and the other social externalities associated 
with natural resource extraction.  
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